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Abstract
In	   this	   paper	   I 	   argue 	   that	   holes 	   are 	   not	   objects,	   but	   should	   instead	   be	   construed	   as	  
properties 	  or	   relations.	   The 	  argument	   proceeds 	  by	   first	  establishing	  a 	  claim	  about	  angles:	  
that	   angles 	  are	  not	   objects,	   but	   properties 	  or	   relations.	   It	   is 	  then	   argued	   that	   holes	  and	  
angles	  belong	  to	  the	  same	  category,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	   they	   share 	  distinctive	  existence	  
and	  identity	   conditions.	   This	  provides 	  an	  argument	   in	   favour	   of	   categorizing	  holes 	  as	  one	  
categorizes	  angles.	   I	   then	  argue	  that	   a 	  commitment	   to	  the	  existence 	  of	   properties 	  to	  be	  
identified	  with	  holes	  provides	  sufficient	  resources	  to	  account	  for	  true	  claims	  about	  holes.
Introduction
In	  this	  paper	  I 	  will 	  argue 	  for	  a 	  claim	  about	  what	  holes	  are	  not:	  specifically,	  that	  holes	  
are	  not	  objects.	  To	  this 	  extent	  I	  will 	  be	  arguing	  against	  a 	  certain	  kind	  of	  realism	  about	  holes:	  
one 	   which	   construes 	   holes 	   as 	   particular	   objects.	   If	   I 	   am	   coy	   about	   the	   extent	   of	   my	  
conclusions,	  however,	  this	  is	  because 	  an	  adequate	  account	  of	  what	  holes 	  are	  depends 	  first	  
on	  an	  adequate 	  account	  of	  what	  the	  fundamental	  categories 	  of	  things 	  are:	  i.e.	  an	  adequate	  
ontology.	   This	  is 	  a 	  matter	   over	  which	  there	  is 	  substantial	  philosophical 	  disagreement.	  My	  
purpose	  here	  is	  to	  provide 	  an	  argument	  against	   this 	  specific	   kind	  of	   realism	  about	   holes	  
which	  is	  not	  hostage	  to	  the	  correctness	  of	  a	  particular	  ontological	  system.
Before 	  proceeding,	  however,	   I 	  should	  be	  clear	   about	  what	   I 	  mean	  by	   realism	  about	  
holes.	  One 	  dispute	  someone	  may	  have	  with	  the 	  doctrine	  that	  holes 	  are	  real	  entities 	  can	  be	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characterised	   in	   terms 	  of	   a 	  disagreement	   about	   whether	   we 	  should	   take 	  seriously	   the	  
existential 	   commitment	   implicit	   in	   sentences	   about	   holes 	   featuring	   existential	  
quantification,	  as 	  in	  ‘There	  is 	  a	  hole	  in	  my	  heart.’	  On	  this	  view	  the 	  realist	  thinks	  there	  are	  
holes	  and	  the	  non-­‐realist	  thinks	  there	  are	  not.	  A	  dispute	  framed	  in	  such	  a 	  way	   immediately	  
puts 	  common	  sense	  on	   the	   side	  of	   the	  realist,	   as	  it	   requires 	  the	  non-­‐realist	   to	  deny	   the	  
existence	  of	  holes.1	  However,	  the	  feeling	  that	  holes 	  are 	  ontologically	  suspect	  need	  not	  find	  
expression	  in	  just	  this	  one 	  kind	  of	  dispute.	  An	  alternative	  expression	  of	  such	  concerns 	  might	  
be	  a 	  disagreement	  about	  what	  holes	  are:	  a	  disagreement	  about	  which	  of	  the 	  fundamental	  
divisions	  of	  reality	   holes	  fall 	  into.	   Are 	  holes	  objects 	  or	   properties?	  Are	  they	   universals	  or	  
particulars?	   It	   is 	   this 	  dispute	   that	   I 	  wish	   to	   attend	  to	   in	   this 	  paper:	   which	   fundamental	  
ontological	  category	  do	  holes	  belong	  to?
Of	   course,	   an	   interesting	   discussion	  about	   which	   ontological 	  category	   something	  
belongs	  to	  presupposes	  some	  level 	  of	  agreement	  about	  what	  ontological	  categories 	  there	  
are	  and,	  as 	  I 	  have	  said,	  this	  is	  an	  issue	  over	  which	  there	  is	  substantial 	  disagreement.	   In	  the	  
present	   paper	   I 	  will 	  restrict	   the	  discussion	  to	   just	   one	   categorial 	  distinction:	   the	  object/
property	   distinction.	   This 	   will	   allow	   me	   to	   illustrate 	   some	   of	   the	   implications	   of	   my	  
arguments 	   for	   two	   influential	   ontological 	   systems 	   in	   metaphysics 	   which	   accept	   this	  
distinction:	   the	  two	  category	   ontology	   favoured	  by	  David	  Armstrong	  and	  the	  four	  category	  
ontology	  defended	  by	  E	  J	  Lowe.	  My	   conclusion	  will 	  be	  that	  whatever	  holes	  may	  turn	  out	  to	  
be,	   they	   will 	  not	   be	  objects:	   so,	   in	  Armstrong’s 	  ontology	   they	  will 	  not	   be	  particulars,	   but	  
universals.	   In	  Lowe’s 	  ontology	   they	  will	  neither	   be	  what	   he 	  calls 	  ‘substances’	   nor	  what	  he	  
calls	  ‘kinds’,	  but	  will	  fall	  into	  one	  of	  the	  other	  two	  fundamental	  categories.	  
In	  what	  follows 	  I	  will 	  call 	  the	  view	  that	  holes	  are	  objects 	  of	  some	  sort	  ‘objectualism’,	  
and	   the 	   contrasting	   view	   that	   holes 	   are 	   properties 	   or	   relations 	   of	   some	   sort	   ‘non-­‐
1 More will be said on this view later. See section 4.
objectualism’.	   So,	  my	  argument	  is 	  intended	  to	  show	  that	  objectualism	  about	  holes,	   in	  this	  
sense,	   is 	  mistaken.	   In	   this	   way,	   the	   kind	   of	   realist	   position	   which	   categorises 	  holes	   as	  
particular,	   immaterial 	  objects 	  which	  are 	  the 	  complements 	  of	  material 	  objects,	   such	  as 	  that	  
elaborated	   by	   Casati	   and	   Varzi 	   in	   their	   classic	   discussion	   of	   the	   topic,	   Holes	   and	   other	  
superficialities,	  will 	  be 	  ruled	  out	  of	  court.	  However,	  it	  will 	  also	  rule	  out	  the 	  (also	  realist)	  view	  
of	  holes	  as 	  particular	  material	  objects 	  of	  some	  sort,	  as	  defended	  by	  the 	  character	  of	  Argle	  in	  
David	   and	   Stephanie	   Lewis’	   dialogue	   on	   holes.	   In	   spite	   of	   this 	   latter	   point,	   the	   view	   I	  
articulate 	  here	  is 	  closer	   in	  spirit	  to	  this 	  ‘Ludovician’	  account	  of	  holes,	  as 	  Castai 	  and	  Varzi 	  call	  
it,	   though	   not	   on	   account	   of	   any	   particularly	   strong	   sympathy	   with	  materialist	   or	   more	  
general	  naturalist	  tendencies.
My	   strategy	   for	   arguing	  for	  this 	  conclusion	  proceeds	  by	  way	  of	  an	  argument	   about	  
the	   nature	   of	   angles.	   The	   rationale	   for	   this 	   strategy	   is	   that	   angles 	   bear	   many	   of	   the	  
distinctive,	   puzzling	   features 	  of	  holes,	   so	  a	  sound	  understanding	  of	  what	   kind	  of	  thing	  an	  
angle	  is 	  should	  give 	  us 	  some 	  indication	  of	  what	  should	  be	  said	  about	  holes.	  The 	  argument	  
presented	   in	  this 	  paper	   has 	  three	  stages.	   The	  first	   stage 	  consists 	  of	   an	  argument	   for	   the	  
claim	  that	  angles	  should	  not	  be 	  categorised	  as 	  objects 	  or	  particulars,	  but	  rather	  as 	  relations.	  
The	   second	   stage	   argues 	   that	   the 	   categorisation	   of	   holes	   should	   be	   the	   same	   as 	   the	  
categorisation	   of	   angles.	   The	   upshot	   of	   these 	  two	   sections 	  will 	  be	   the 	  claim	   that	   holes	  
should	   not	   be 	   categorised	   as 	   objects.	   The	   final 	   stage	   of	   the	   argument	   will 	   be	   to	   say	  
something	  about	   the	  quite	  general 	  challenge	  to	  the 	  ‘non-­‐objectualist’	  to	  outline	  a 	  schema	  
for	  expressing	  all	  true	  sentences 	  about	  holes 	  in	  a	  way	  that	  does 	  not	  imply	  the	  existence 	  of	  
objects	  that	  are	  the	  holes.
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  objects
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   The	  first	   stage 	  of	   the	  argument	   is	  to 	  say	   something	  about	   what	   kind	  of	  entity	   an	  
angle	  is.	  So,	  what	  kind	  of	  an	  entity	   is 	  an	  angle?	  In	  particular,	  is 	  it	  an	  object	  or	  a	  property	  or	  
relation?	   Before	   answering	   this 	  question,	   it	   is 	   important	   to	   provide	   some	  definitions	  of	  
these	  philosophical 	  terms	  of	  art.	  I	  have 	  said	  that	  I 	  intend	  my	  argument	  to	  not	  be	  hostage 	  to	  
a 	   particular	   ontology,	   so	   my	   discussion	   will 	   involve	   considering	   a 	   number	   of	   ways	   of	  
capturing	  the 	  distinction	  in	  question.	   The	  first	  thing	  to	  stipulate	  is 	  that	  where 	  I	  talk	  about	  
properties,	   I	   intend	   this 	   to	   include	   relations,	   so	   the 	  distinction	   in	   question	   is 	  between	  
objects 	  on	  the 	  one 	  hand	  and	  properties	  and	  relations 	  on	  the	  other.	  One 	  characterization	  of	  
this 	  distinction	  is	   that	   objects	  are 	  essentially	   bearers 	  of	  properties.	   This 	  characterization	  
says 	  almost	  nothing	  about	  the	  nature 	  of	  properties,	  though,	  and	  this 	  means 	  we	  must	  give	  a	  
more	  detailed	   characterization	  of	   properties.	   One	  characterization,	   introduced	  by	   Jerrold	  
Levinson,	  is	  that	  properties 	  are	  ways 	  of	  being:	  ways 	  things	  are.2	  This 	  idea	  that	  properties 	  are	  
ways 	  of	  being	   is 	  minimally	  what	   I	  require	  for	  my	   argument	   in 	  favour	   of	  non-­‐objectualism	  
about	   holes,	   but	   it	   is 	  worth	   observing	   that	   the	  object/property	   distinction,	   if	   it	   is 	  to	   be	  
exclusive	  and	  exhaustive 	  must	  be	  such	  that	  we	  can	  say	   that	  anything	  that	   is 	  a 	  way	  of	  being	  
cannot	   be 	   an	   object.	   This 	   is 	   something	   Lowe	   captures 	   in	   his 	   characterization	   of	   the	  
distinction,	   where 	   objects	   are	   construed	   as 	   entities 	   of	   order	   zero	   and	   properties 	   are	  
understood	  as 	  entities 	  of	   an	  order	   greater	   than	   zero.	   The	  general	  idea 	  is	  that	  entities 	  of	  
order	  greater	  than	  zero	  characterize	  those 	  entities	  of	  a 	  lower	  order,	  but	  those 	  of	  order	  zero	  
characterize 	  no	  entity	   at	  all 	  –	  an	  idea	  that	  captures	  the	  traditional 	  Aristotelian	  notion	  of	  a	  
substance.3
I 	  will 	  briefly	  also	  say	  something	  about	  Armstrong’s 	  treatment	  of	  the	  object/property	  
distinction.	   For	   Armstrong	   the	   object/property	   distinction	   is 	   taken	   to	   be	   adequately	  
2 See Levinson (1978)
3 See Lowe (2006), p. 72
captured	  by	   the	  particular/universal	  distinction,	  which	  provides	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  non-­‐
identical 	  things 	  can	  have 	  the 	  same 	  property,	  or	   have 	  the	  same	  way	  of	  being.	   If	  properties	  
are	   construed	   as	   Armstrong’s	   universals,	   then	   this	   does 	   require 	   the	   ‘non-­‐objectualist’	  
position	   to	   be	   slightly	   more	   complex	   than	   if	   we	   admit	   particular	   properties,	   but	   I 	  will	  
address	   this	   in	   the 	   third	   section	   of	   my	   discussion.	   What	   is	   important	   here 	   is 	   that,	   for	  
Armstrong,	   universals 	  are	   supposed	   to	   stand	   to	   particulars 	  as 	  properties	  are	  thought	   to	  
stand	  to	  objects:	  as 	  ways 	  those	  objects	  are.	   So,	  with	  the	  idea 	  in	  place	  that	   properties	  are	  
ways	  objects	  are,	  let	  us	  turn	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  angles	  are	  properties	  or	  objects.
We	  must	  first	  distinguish	  between	  two	  different	  uses 	  of	  the	  word	  ‘angle’.	  Sometimes	  
this 	  word	  is 	  used	  in	  a 	  complex	  expression	  that	   refers 	  to	  a 	  figure	  formed	  by	   lines 	  or	  planes,	  
such	  as 	  in	  ‘this 	  angle’	  in	  the 	  sentence	  ‘this 	  angle 	  is	  made 	  of	  red	  lines’.4	   In	  such	  cases,	  the	  
word	  ‘angle’	  serves	  to	  enable	  ostensive 	  reference	  to	  a	  figure 	  by	  specifying	  a 	  property	  of	  the	  
object	  being	  referred	  to.	  However,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  word	  ‘angle’	  has 	  a 	  reference 	  of	  its 	  own	  in	  
this 	  example,	  its	  reference	  is 	  a 	  shape	  property.	   Just	  as	  we	  have	  only	   a	  comparatively	   small	  
number	   of	   words 	   to	   express	   colour	   variety	   compared	   to	   the	   vast	   number	   of	   colour	  
properties,	  so	  too	  are	  there	  many	  shape	  properties 	  we	  do	  not	  have	  names 	  for:	  for	  instance,	  
the	  particular	  shape 	  of	  my	  cat	  as 	  he 	  sits,	  unmoving	  on	  my	  desk.	  It	  is 	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  the	  
above	  expression	  may	  be	  used	  to	  speak	  about	  a 	  wide	  range	  of	  figures.	  Compare	  the	  above	  
expression	  about	  an	  angle 	  with	  an	  analogous 	  expression	  about	  a 	  shaped	  figure:	  ‘this 	  square	  
is 	  made	  of	  red	  lines’.	  Here	  we	  have	  a	  word	  that	  refers 	  to	  some	  fairly	  specific	  shape	  property	  
which	  characterizes 	  the 	  figure	  in	  question.	  In	  both	  cases,	  though,	  these	  two	  claims 	  involve	  a	  
commitment	  to	  an	  object	  that	  is	  a	  figure	  of	  a	  certain	  kind,	  or	  is	  shaped	  in	  a	  certain	  way.
It	   seems,	   then,	   that	   one	  use	  of	  ‘angle’	   clearly	   does 	  carry	  with	  it	   a	  commitment	   to	  
objects.	  However,	  this 	  is 	  not	  particularly	  philosophically	  interesting,	  because	  it	  does 	  not	  tell	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4 The examples I concentrate on in this section are two dimensional angles, but I discuss three dimensional 
angles in section 4.
us	  whether	  angles 	  fall 	  on	  the	  ‘object’	  side 	  or	   the	  ‘property’	  side 	  of	  the 	  distinction	  between	  
objects 	  and	  properties.	  All 	  that	  has	  been	  made	  plain	  so	  far	  is 	  that,	  when	  they	  are	  true,	  such	  
sentences	  entail 	  the 	  existence	  of	   some	  object	   that	   is	  a 	  certain	  way.	   In	   the	   case 	  of	   ‘this	  
square	  is 	  made	  of	  red	  lines’	  it	  is 	  the 	  existence 	  of	  an	  object	  that	  is 	  square.	  In	  the 	  case	  of	  ‘this	  
angle	  is 	  made 	  of	  red	  lines’	  it	  is 	  some 	  object	  that	  is 	  shaped	  in	  the 	  distinctive 	  way	  that	  we	  get	  
by	  putting	  two	  straight	  lines 	  together	  so	  one	  of	  their	  ends 	  meet.	  It	  will 	  be	  necessary	  to	  refer	  
to	  this 	  distinctive 	  way	  of	  being	  throughout	  the	  course 	  of	  my	  discussion,	  so	  I 	  propose	  to	  use	  
the	  expression	  ‘angular’,	  as	  in	  ‘some	  object	  is	  angular’	  and	  ‘this	  is	  an	  angular	  figure’.
However,	   there	  is 	  a 	  second	  use	  of	   the	  word	  ‘angle’	  whose	  ontological 	  implications	  
are	  much	  less 	  clear	  and	  which	  is	  more	  revealing	  of	  the	  ontological 	  status	  of	  angles.	  This 	  is	  
the	  use	  employed	  when	  we	  speak	  of	  a	  particular	  figure	  having	  an	  angle 	  of	  a	  certain	  measure	  
or	  when	  we	  speak	  of	  different	  figures 	  having	  the 	  same	  angle.	  This 	  second	  use	  of	  ‘angle’	  is	  
the	  one	  that	  is 	  the 	  subject	  of	  mathematical 	  investigation	  and	  expression:	  in	  mathematics	  an	  
angle	   between	   two	   lines	   is 	   construed	   as 	   the 	   amount	   of	   rotation	   about	   a	   point	   of	  
intersection	  that	  is	  required	  to	  bring	  one	  line	  into	  correspondence	  with	  another.
What	  should	  we	  say	   about	   this 	  second	  use	  of	   ‘angle’?	  One	  way	  of	  addressing	   this	  
question	   is 	  to	   take	   the	   syntax	   of	   expressions 	  where	   it	   occurs	   as 	  an	   initial 	   guide	   to	   the	  
ontology.	  So,	  consider	   an	  expression	  of	  the 	  form	  ‘figure	  a	  has 	  an	  angle	  of	  n	  degrees’.	  In	  so	  
far	   as 	  we	  might	  be 	  entitled	  to	  do	  so,	  we	  could	  read	  off	  from	  the	  syntax	  that	  three	  entities	  
are	  involved	  in	  the	  state 	  of	  affairs 	  described:	  the	  object	  a,	  which	  is 	  a 	  figure;	  an	  angle;	  and	  a	  
measure	  of	  that	  angle.	  However,	  this 	  would	  not	  settle	  the	  ontological 	  status 	  of	  the	  second	  
and	   third	   entities	   in	   the	   list.	   The 	   measure	   of	   the 	   angle	   can	   be	   dealt	   with	   fairly	  
straightforwardly:	  being	  a 	  measure	  of	  the	  angle	  strongly	  suggests	  it	  is 	  a	  way	  of	  being	  for	  the	  
angle,	  and	  so	  falls 	  on	  the	  property	  side	  of	  the 	  object/property	  distinction.	  The	  second	  entity	  
in	  the	  list,	  the 	  angle,	  is 	  not	  so	  straightforwardly	  dealt	  with:	  is	  it	  an	  object	  to	  which	  the 	  figure	  
a	  is	  related,	  or	  is	  it	  a	  property	  which	  the	  figure	  bears?
Thus	  far	  we	  have	  two	  rival 	  ontologies 	  for	  states 	  of	  affairs	  involving	  angles:	  one	  which	  
counts 	  the	  angle	  had	  by	   the	  figure	  as	  an	  object;	  one	  which	  counts	  it	  as	  a 	  property.	   These	  
rival 	  ontologies	  were	  arrived	  at	  by	  considering	  the 	  syntax	  of	  sentences 	  about	  figures 	  having	  
angles.	  However,	  syntax	  does 	  not	  always 	  indicate 	  the	  correct	  ontology.	  In	  the 	  present	  case,	  
the	  following	  consideration	  is 	  important:	  whenever	  there	  is 	  an	  angle,	  there 	  will 	  also	  be	  (at	  
least)	   two	  lines 	  that	  are 	  spatially	   related,	  which	  compose	  the	  angular	   figure.	  This 	  point	   is	  
significant	   for	   two	   reasons.	   The 	   first	   is 	   that	   it	   provides	   an	   argument	   against	   the 	   first	  
ontology	  specified	  above,	  which	  construes	  the	  angle	  as 	  an	  object	  to	  which	  the	  angular	  figure	  
is	  related.
How	  might	  this 	  ontology	   incorporate	  the	  preceding	  point?	  It	  might	  be	  said	  that	  the	  
lines 	  compose 	  the 	  angular	   figure,	  or	  that	  the	  lines 	  compose 	  the 	  angle.	  But	  how	  are	  we	  to	  
decide	  which	   they	   compose?	   One	  suggestion	  might	   be 	  that	   the	  locution	   ‘x	   has 	  angle 	  y’	  
should	  be 	  understood	  as 	  expressing	  a 	  relation	  of	  constitution	  between	  an	  angular	  figure	  and	  
an	  object,	  the	  angle.	  So,	  the 	  lines 	  compose	  the	  angle,	  which	  constitutes	  the	  angular	  figure.	  
The	  difficulty	  with	  this	  view	  lies 	  in	  that	  fact	  that	  the	  composition	  conditions	  for	  the	  angular	  
figure 	  and	   the	  putatively	   distinct	   object	   that	   is 	  the	  angle	   are	   just	   the	  same.	   In	  cases	  of	  
constitution,	  such	  as 	  when	  a 	  statue	  is 	  constituted	  by	   a	  lump	  of	  bronze,	  the	  motivation	  for	  
counting	  the	  lump	  and	  the	  statue	  as 	  numerically	  distinct	  is 	  that	  the	  composition	  conditions	  
for	   each	  are 	  different.	   But	   this 	  is 	  not	   the	  case 	  here:	   the	  composition	   conditions	  for	   the	  
angular	  figure	  and	  the	  putatively	  non-­‐identical 	  object,	  the	  angle,	  are	  just	  given	  in	  terms 	  of	  
the	  lines 	  composing	  them.	  Both	  the 	  angle	  and	  the 	  angular	  figure 	  can	  survive	  replacement	  of	  
the	  composing	   lines 	  with	   other,	   numerically	   distinct	   lines.	   This 	  sameness	  of	   composition	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conditions	  argues 	  in	  favor	  of	  counting	  only	  one 	  of	  these	  entities,	  the 	  angle 	  and	  the	  angular	  
figure,	  as	  an	  object.
A	   second	   consideration	   against	   the	   present	   ontology	   has 	  to	   do	   with	   patterns 	  of	  
existential	  dependency	  between	  the	  angle 	  and	  the	  angular	  object.	  The	  angle 	  depends 	  for	  its	  
existence	  on	  the 	  object:	  obliterate	  the	  object	  and	  there 	  will 	  be	  no	  way	   it	  is.	  This 	  pattern	  of	  
dependency	   is 	   characteristic	   of	   the 	   idea	   that	   properties	   are	   ways 	  objects 	  can	   be.	   This	  
thought	  gets	  captured	  in	  different	  ways	  by	  different	  ontological	  systems:	  Lowe	  captures 	  this	  
in	   terms	   of	   rigid	   existential 	   and	   identity	   dependence 	   of	   particular	   properties	   on	   the	  
particular	  objects 	  they	   characterize;	  Armstrong	   captures 	  this 	  idea,	   though	  less	  fully,	   in	  his	  
commitment	  to	  immanent	  realism	  about	  universals.	  Armstrong’s 	  position	  does	  not	  capture	  
the	  full 	  content	  of	  the	  intuition	  that	  the	  existential 	  dependence	  of	  properties	  on	  objects	  is	  
rigid,	  but	  this	  is	  perhaps	  so	  much	  the	  worse 	  for	  his 	  ontological	  system.	  Irrespective	  of	  this,	  
even	  in 	  Armstrong’s 	  ontology	   this 	  point	   about	   the 	  pattern	  of	  ontological 	  dependence	  still	  
favours	  classing	  angles	  on	  the	  property	  side	  of	  the	  object/property	  distinction.
The	   second	   significant	   feature	   of	   the	   observation	   that	   certain	   lines,	   which	   are	  
spatially	  related	  in	  a	  certain	  way,	  compose	  the	  angular	   figure	  is 	  that	   it	  provides 	  reason	  for	  
thinking	  that	  we	  may	  have	  been	  mistaken	  in	  trying	  to	  arrive	  at	  our	  ontology	  simply	  from	  the	  
syntax	  of	  a 	  particular	  group	  of	  expressions.	  The 	  syntax	  of	  an	  expression	  like	  ‘x	  has 	  an	  angle	  
of	   n	  degrees’	   suggested	   three 	  entities;	   however,	   the	  observation	   that	   when	   there 	  is	  an	  
angular	  figure	  there 	  will 	  also	  be 	  some	  parts 	  of	  it	  which	  are	  spatially	  related	  suggests	  a 	  more	  
minimal 	  ontology.	  We	  might	   put	   the	  point	   like 	  this:	   there	   is 	  an	  angular	   figure	  which	   is	  
composed	   of	   lines	   which	   are	   angled,	   where 	   ‘angled’	   is 	   shorthand	   for	   some	   complex	  
predicate	   expressing	   a 	   spatial 	   relation	   between	   the	   lines.	   This 	   account	   would	   be	  
ontologically	  more	  parsimonious	  than	  the	  ontology	  which	  acknowledges 	  an	  angular	  figure,	  a	  
property	  possessed	  by	  it,	  a 	  property	  of	  that	  property	  and	  lines 	  composing	  the	  figure 	  and	  the	  
spatial 	  relation	  between	  them.	  However,	  in	  this 	  more	  parsimonious	  ontology,	   the	  angle 	  is	  
just	  the	  spatial	  relation	  between	  composing	  lines:	  that	  is 	  the	  thing	  which	  is 	  of	  n	  degrees.	  So,	  
even	  here	  the	  angle	  falls	  on	  the	  property	  side	  of	  the	  object/property	  distinction.
These	   various	   arguments 	  all 	   point	   toward	   the	   conclusion	   that	   an	   angle,	   in	   this	  
second	  sense,	  is 	  a	  property	  or	  relation,	  rather	  than	  an	  object.	  There	  remains 	  the 	  question	  of	  
whether	   angles 	  should	  be 	  understood	  as 	  universals 	  or	   particulars,	  which	  I	  will	  leave	  open	  
here,	  but	  will	  discuss	  in	  brief	  in	  section	  three.
Angles	  and	  Holes
If	  the	  foregoing	  argument	  is 	  correct,	  then	  it	  indicates 	  how	  we	  should	  understand	  the	  
metaphysics 	  of	   holes.	   Following	   the	   work	   of	   Casati 	   and	   Varzi 	   in	   their	   Holes	   and	   other	  
superficialities,	  we	  need	  to	  have	  a 	  general	  account	   that	  unifies 	  the	  following	  phenomena:	  
cavities,	  depressions	  and	  tunnels.	  The 	  reason	  is 	  that	  each	  of	  these	  phenomena	  is	  a 	  case	  of	  
some 	  material 	  object	  being	  shaped	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  surrounds 	  a 	  region	  of	  space 	  which	  
could,	  in	  principle,	  not	  contain	  any	  matter.	  Our	  ordinary	  expressions	  about	  such	  phenomena	  
include	  substantives 	  which,	   taken	  at	   face 	  value,	  appear	  to	  name 	  entities:	   ‘the	  cavity’;	   ‘the	  
depression’;	  ‘the	  tunnel’.	   These	  entities 	  are	  also	  countable:	   a	  material 	  object	   can	  have,	  or	  
host,	  two	  cavities,	  three	  depressions,	  four	  tunnels.	  Moreover,	  accounts	  of	  these	  phenomena	  
seem	   to	   run	   up	   against	   the	   same	  metaphysical	   puzzles:	   if	   we	   replace	   some	   parts 	  of	   a	  
material 	  object	   hosting	  one	  of	  these	  things 	  with	  other	  parts 	  of	  the	  same	  stuff,	  we	  have	  a	  
different	  lump,	  but	  the 	  same	  cavity,	  depression	  or	  tunnel.	  If	  we	  replace	  parts 	  of	  the	  matter	  
filling	  the 	  space	  surrounded	  by	  the 	  material 	  object	  with	  parts	  of	  the	  same	  original 	  kind,	  then	  
we 	  still 	  have	  the 	  same	  cavity,	   depression	  or	   tunnel.	   Also,	   these	  entities 	  seem	  to	  depend	  
upon	  their	  host	  for	  their	  existence 	  in	  some	  way:	  destroy	  the	  material 	  object	  and	  we	  are	  not	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left	  with	  the	  cavity,	   depression,	  or	   tunnel.	  Lewis 	  Carroll’s 	  fiction	  of	  the	  Cheshire 	  Cat’s 	  grin	  
remaining	  after	  the	  cat	  had	  disappeared	  takes	  its	  absurdity	  from	  this	  point.	  
These	   points 	   can	   be 	   summed	   up	   in	   the	   following	   way:	   all 	   three 	   cases 	   share	  
distinctive	  existence	  and	  identity	  conditions,	  so	  they	  should	  be	  all	  counted	  as 	  instances	  of	  a	  
single	   sort	   of	   phenomena:	   a	   hole.	   In	   addition,	   there 	   is 	   a	   similarity	   in	   respect	   of	   their	  
epistemic	  status:	   perceptual	  awareness 	  of	  the 	  entity	   in 	  all 	  cases	  depends 	  upon	  perceptual	  
awareness	   of	   the	   object	   hosting	   them.	   Perceptual 	   awareness 	   of	   a	   tunnel 	   depends 	   on	  
perceptual 	  awareness 	  of	  some	  portion	  of	  its 	  host.	  This 	  is	  true	  also	  of	  cavities,	  although	  there	  
are	   contingent	   reasons 	  why	   we	   cannot	   perceive	   many	   cavities,	   such	   as	   the	   density	   or	  
thickness 	  of	  the	  host.	  We	  can	  perceive 	  some	  cavities,	  as 	  when	  we	  look	  at	  a	  mosquito	  net,	  or	  
some 	  other	   thin	  material,	   hanging	  draped	  over	   a 	  bed.	   If	  we	  had	  some	  form	  of	  perceptual	  
system	  utilizing	  sonar,	   then	  we	  could	  become	  perceptually	   aware 	  of	  cavities 	  in	  denser	   or	  
thicker	  materials.	  As 	  with	  the	  metaphysical	  points,	  this	  also	  argues,	  though	  less 	  strongly,	  in	  
favour	  of	  a	  single	  unified	  account	  of	  these	  phenomena.
So,	   the	  reason	  for	   treating	  cavities,	   depressions 	  and	   tunnels 	  as 	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  
entity,	  for	   demanding	  a 	  unified	  account	  of	   these	  phenomena,	   is 	  that	   they	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  
same	  metaphysical 	  puzzles.	  A	  solution	  to	  these	  puzzles 	  for	  one	  of	  them	  would	  be	  adequate	  
as 	  a 	  solution	  for	  all	  of	  them.	  What	   I 	  will 	  argue 	  now	  is 	  that	  exactly	   the 	  same	  considerations	  
apply	   to	   angles.	   Consequently,	   the 	  account	   of	   what	   angles	  are 	  and	   the 	  account	   of	  what	  
cavities,	  depressions	  and	  tunnels	  are	  must	  be	  the	  same.
One	  thing	  that	  is	  of	  note	  about	  cavities,	   depressions 	  and	  tunnels 	  is	  that	  when	  the	  
material 	  object	  they	  are	  hosted	  by	  is 	  three	  dimensional,	  there 	  will 	  be 	  two	  dimensional	  cross	  
sections	  of	  that	  object	  which	  are	  very	  like 	  angles.	   Let’s 	  start	  with	  the	  simplest	  case:	  take 	  a	  
conical	  depression,	  such	  as 	  is 	  found	  in	  children’s 	  party	   hats.	   Now	  take 	  a 	  two	  dimensional	  
slice	  of	  that	  conical 	  depression	  which	  cuts 	  through	  the	  vertex.	  This 	  will 	  produce	  a	  V	  shape:	  
an	   angular	   figure.	   Whatever	   kind	   of	   thing	   we	   have	   here,	   it	   generates 	   all	   the	   same	  
metaphysical	  problems	  that	  the	  three	  dimensional	  holes	  generate:	  
1. There	  is	  some	  material 	  object	   shaped	  in	  such	  a 	  way	   that	   it	   surrounds	  a	  region	  of	  
space	  which	  could,	  in	  principle,	  not	  contain	  any	  matter.
2. Our	  ordinary	   language	  expressions 	  of	  such	  phenomena	  include	  substantives	  which,	  
taken	  at	  face	  value,	  appear	  to	  name	  entities:	  e.g.	  ‘the	  angle’.
3. These	  entities 	  are 	  also	  countable:	  the	  difference	  between	  'V'	  shapes	  and	  'W'	  shapes	  
shows 	   up	   in	   true	   statements	   featuring	   quantifiers:	   'There	   is	   one	   point	   of	  
intersection',	  etc.	  
4. If	  we	  replace 	  some	  parts 	  of	  the	  material	  objects	  with	  other	  parts 	  of	  the	  same 	  kind,	  
we	  have	  a	  different	  lump,	  but	  the	  same	  angle.
5. If	  we 	  replace	  parts	  of	  the	  matter	  filling	  the	  space	  surrounded	  by	  the	  material	  object	  
with	  parts	  of	  the	  same	  original	  kind,	  then	  we	  still	  have	  the	  same	  angle.	  
6. Also,	  these 	  entities 	  seem	  to	  depend	  upon	  their	  host	  for	  their	  existence	  in	  some	  way:	  
destroy	  the	  material	  object	  and	  we	  are	  not	  left	  with	  the	  angle.
7. The	  perceptual	  conditions 	  are	  the 	  same:	  you	  see	  a	  hole	  by	  seeing	  its 	  ‘host’	  and	  you	  
see	  an	  angle	  by	  seeing	  the	  thing	  shaped	  in	  a	  certain	  way.
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The	  moral 	  to	  draw	  is 	  that	  whatever	  general	  metaphysical 	  story	  we	  tell 	  about	  angles,	  
the	   same	   account	   should	  be	   given	   for	   holes.	   However,	   this 	  applies	  not	   simply	   to	   those	  
figures 	  arrived	  at	   by	  taking	  a 	  two	  dimensional 	  slice 	  of	  a 	  material 	  object	  with	  a 	  depression	  
that	   has 	  a 	  solid	  angle	   in 	  it:	   it	   also	  applies 	  to	  depressions 	  which	  are	  curved.	   Consider	   the	  
depression	  in	  a 	  soup	  bowl:	  if	  we	  take 	  a 	  two	  dimensional	  slice	  of	  this 	  which	  cuts 	  through	  the	  
bottom	  of	  the	  bowl,	  then	  we 	  get	  a 	  curved	  figure.	  This	  is	  not	  composed,	  like 	  the 	  angle,	  of	  two	  
parts	   standing	   in	   a	   relation	   but	   of	   many	   point-­‐like 	  parts 	   standing	   in	   relations:	   relations	  
which	  are 	  captured	  by	  the	  equation	  for	  the	  particular	   curve	  in	  question.	  This	  curved	  figure	  
generates	  all	  the	  same	  metaphysical	  puzzles	  as	  cavities,	  depressions	  and	  tunnels.
	   Once	  curves 	  are	  admitted	  to	  be	  the	  same	  type	  of	  thing	  as 	  angles 	  we	  can	  meet	  
an	   objection	   that	   might	   be 	  raised	   about	   angles 	  and	   the	   party	   hat	   example.	   It	   may	   be	  
objected	  that	  there 	  are 	  many	  more	  ways 	  of	  slicing	  through	  an	  object	  with	  a 	  depression	  in	  it	  
than	  just	  though	  the	  vertex	  of	  the	  solid	  angle.	  We 	  could	  cut	  through	  a	  conic	  depression	  to	  
get	  a 	  two	  dimensional	  slice 	  that	   is	  a 	  curved	  figure	  or	  a	  circular	   figure.	  But,	  now	  we	  can	  see	  
that	  the 	  curved	  figure	  is 	  just	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  phenomena	  as 	  the	  angular	  figure.	  Moreover,	  
the	  circular	  figure	  is	  no	  different	  either:	  a	  circle	  is	  just	  a	  closed	  curve.	  
The	  examples	  I 	  have	  been	  considering	  are	  shapes 	  of	  constant	  curvature,	  but	   this 	  is	  
not	  essential 	  to	  the	  case.	  The	  two	  dimensional 	  figures	  of	  variable	  curvature	  which	  would	  be	  
obtained	  from	  taking	  a 	  two	  dimensional 	  slice 	  of	  the	  Statue	  of	  Liberty	  would	  also	  generate	  
the	  same	  issues.	  Now	  we	  can	   see	  that	   neither	   tunnels 	  nor	   cavities 	  generate 	  any	   further	  
considerations 	  that	   need	  special 	  attention.	   Any	   two	  dimensional 	  slice	  through	  either	   will	  
give	  a	  figure	  of	  no	  significant	  difference	  from	  the	  figures	  already	  discussed.
	   So,	   angular,	   curved	  and	  circular	   figures	  are 	  just	   two-­‐dimensional	   instances 	  of	   the	  
same	   phenomena 	   that	   cavities,	   depressions 	   and	   tunnels 	   are.	   But	   we	   already	   have	   a	  
principled	  account	  for	  angular	  figures.	  There	  is	  the	  angular	  figure,	  the	  lines 	  composing	  it	  and	  
the	  spatial 	  relation	  between	  them.	  There	  is 	  no	  additional 	  object	  that	  is	  the 	  angle,	  somehow	  
related	  to	   the 	  angular	   figure.	   There 	  is 	  just	   the	  spatial 	  relation,	  which	   is 	  what	  our	   talk	  of	  
angles	  is 	  really	  about.	  It	  is 	  in	  virtue	  of	  this 	  spatial 	  relation	  that	  the	  lines 	  surround	  a	  region	  of	  
space	   that	   could	   in	   principle	   not	   contain	   any	   matter.5 	   The	   argument	   in	   the 	   foregoing	  
discussion	   leads 	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   this 	   account	   should	   be	   adopted	   for	   the 	   three	  
dimensional 	  cases:	   for	  cavities,	  depressions	  and	  tunnels.	  There 	  is 	  the	  shaped	  object,	  which	  
is 	  composed	  of	  material	  parts 	  that	  are	  spatially	   related.	  There	  is 	  no	  additional 	  object	  –	  no	  
bearer	   of	   properties	  or	   entity	   of	   order	   zero	  –	  over	   and	  above	  the	  shaped	  object	   and	  its	  
composing	  parts.	   The	  hole 	  is 	  the 	  spatial 	  relation	  between	  parts	  of	   the	  object,	   in	  virtue	  of	  
which	  those	  parts	  surround	  a	  region	  of	  space	  that	  could	  in	  principle	  not	  contain	  any	  matter.
How	  To	  Talk	  About	  Holes
	   I 	  have 	  argued	   that	   holes	  and	   angles 	  raise	   the	   same	   set	   of	   philosophical 	  puzzles,	  
particularly	  in	  respect	  of	  their	  identity	  and	  existence	  conditions.	  For	  this	  reason	  they	  should	  
be	  categorized	  as	  the	  same	  sort	  of	  entity.	  I	  have	  also	  argued	  that	  angles 	  are 	  most	  plausibly	  
construed	  as 	  falling	  on	  the	  property	   side	  of	   the	  object/property	   distinction.	  However,	  the	  
following	  objection	  might	  be	  voiced:	   if	  angles	  raise	  the 	  same	  kind	  of	  problems 	  as 	  do	  holes,	  
then	  the	  success 	  of	  the	  view	  that	  holes 	  are 	  objects 	  in	  dealing	  with	  these 	  difficulties	  argues	  
for	   the	  conclusion	  that	   angles 	  must	  also	  be	  objects.	  To	  meet	   this 	  objection	  it	   needs 	  to	  be	  
shown	   that	   the	   view	   that	   angles 	   and	   holes 	   are	   properties 	   can	   adequately	   solve	   these	  
puzzles.
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5 Even	  in	  the	  more	  inflated	  ontology	  which	  acknowledges	  also	  the	  property	  that	  is	  the	  angle	  and	  the	  measure	  
of	  it,	  there	  is	  no	  object	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  figure.
	   I 	  have 	  already	  discussed	  how	  ‘non-­‐objectualism’	  about	  holes 	  deals	  with	  the	  features	  
of	  composition,	  constitution	  and	  dependency	  mentioned	  in	  items	  (4),	  (5)	  and	  (6)	  in	  the	  list	  
given	   in	   the	   previous 	   section.	   I 	   have	   also	   discussed	   items 	   (1)	   and	   (2).	   The	   remaining	  
challenge,	  though,	  for	  any	  ‘non-­‐objectualist’	  about	  holes	  is	  to	  show	  how	  it	  is 	  possible	  to	  deal	  
with	   sentences 	  featuring	  quantification	   over	   holes 	  and	   angles.	   This 	  is 	  one	   of	   the 	  points	  
which	  is 	  most	  easily	  accommodated	  by	  the	  view	  that	  holes 	  and	  angles 	  are	  objects.	  However,	  
I	  think	  that	  there	  is	  a	  fairly	  straightforward	  way	  that	  this	  challenge	  can	  be	  met.	  
Much	  of	   the	   debate	  on	   this 	  topic	   has 	  concentrated	  on	  whether	   it	   is 	  possible 	  to	  
adequately	  paraphrase 	  sentences 	  of	  the	  form	  'there 	  are	  n	  holes 	  in	  x'	  in	  such	  a 	  way	  that	  does	  
not	   involve	  existential 	  quantification	  over	   holes,	   but	   only	   over	   the	  material 	  host	   objects.	  
This 	  is	  usually	  with	  a 	  view	  to	  defending	  the	  account	  of	  holes 	  developed	  by	   Argle	  in	  David	  
and	   Stephanie	   Lewis’	   original	   paper:	   the	   view	   that	   holes 	  are 	  a 	  special 	   class	  of	   material	  
objects,	   the	  ‘hole 	  linings’	   or	   ‘skins’	  of	   the 	  material 	  objects.	   The	  difficulty	   begins 	  with	  the	  
observation	  that	  the	  hosts	  may	  not	  just	  have	  multiple	  holes,	  but	  multiple 	  kinds	  of	  holes,	  and	  
that	  different	  hosts 	  may	  have	  the 	  same	  number	  of	  holes	  which	  may	  be	  dissimilar	  in	  shape.	  
The	  challenge	  is 	  to	  find	  a	  translation	  schema	  which	  can	  do	  justice	  to	  the	  complexity	   that	  
needs 	  expressing,	   but	   without	   introducing	   quantification.	   One	  suggestion	   discussed	   and	  
dismissed	   by	   Casati 	  and	  Varzi	   is 	  the 	  use 	  of	   the 	  sentence	  schema	   'x	   is	   (n,	   j,	   k)-­‐holed'	   to	  
paraphrase	   sentences 	  of	   the 	  form	   'there 	  are 	  n	   (j,	   k)-­‐holes 	  in	   x',	   where 	  j	   stands 	  for	   the	  
number	  of	  edges	  of	  the	  'skin'	  of	  the	  hole	  and	  k	  stands	  for	  the	  topological	  genus	  of	  the	  hole.	  
Casati 	  and	  Varzi 	  dismiss 	  this 	  ‘adverbial’	   solution	  because	  it	   is 	  not	  obvious	  that	   this	  
schema 	  can	  capture	  the	  difference	  between	  hosts 	  with	  two	  unlinked	  toroidal 	  tunnels 	  and	  
hosts	  with	  interlinked	  toroidal 	  tunnels.	   This 	  could	  be 	  dealt	  with	  by	   specifying	  the 	  location	  
and	  orientation	   of	   the	  holes,	   just	   as 	  we	  specify	   the 	  topological	  genus.	   In 	  this 	  way	   some	  
difficulties 	  raised	  by	  the 	  solution	  suggested	  by	  Michael 	  Tye,	  which	  Casati 	  and	  Varzi	  discuss,	  
could	  be	  avoided.	  Tye’s 	  suggestion	  was 	  that	  we	  express	  the 	  situation	  where	  a	  host	  has 	  two	  
interlocking	   tunnels 	  by	   quantifying	   over	   interlocking	   empty	   spatial 	   regions,	   rather	   than	  
holes.	  The	  situation	  could	  then	  be	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  following	  schema:
There	  are	  two	  interlocking,	   torus-­‐shaped	  empty	   spatial 	  regions 	  x	   and	  y	   internal 	  to	  
the	  host,	  and	  the	  host	  is	  (1,	  0,	  1)-­‐holed	  at	  x	  and	  (1,	  0,	  1)-­‐holed	  at	  y.
Casati 	  and	  Varzi	  point	  out	   that	  this 	  solution	  demands	  an	  explanation	  as	  to	  why	   hosts 	  can	  
only	  be	  holed	  at	  the	  empty	  regions	  in	  question.
Whether	  or	  not	  these	  difficulties 	  can	  be	  answered	  by	  Argle,	   I 	  think	  that	  this	  debate	  
can	  be	  neatly	  sidestepped	  by	  the	  view	  that	  holes 	  are	  properties	  or	  relations	  between	  parts	  
of	  the	  host.	  This 	  debate 	  gets 	  under	  way	  because 	  the	  non-­‐realist	  is,	  according	  to	  Casati	  and	  
Varzi,	  trying	  to	  avoid	  existential 	  quantification	  over	  holes,	  but	  existential 	  quantification	  is	  an	  
easy	  way	  of	  capturing	  claims 	  about	  number.	  As	  I 	  construe	  non-­‐objectualism,	  though,	  there	  
is 	  no	  reason	  to	  avoid	  quantification:	  on	  my	  construal 	  the	  non-­‐objectualist	  accepts	  that	  holes	  
exist,	   but	   does	  not	   accept	   that	   they	   are	   objects.	   So,	   the	   non-­‐objectualist	   just	   needs 	  to	  
appeal 	  to	  quantification	  over	   properties 	  and	  this 	  can	  be 	  done 	  in	  either	   of	  the	  ontological	  
systems	  I	  have	  been	  discussing.
It	   is	   intelligible 	  to	   talk	  about	   objects 	  having	  more	  than	  one	   instance	  of	   the	  same	  
property.	   Consider	   a 	  ball 	  which	   has	  a 	  black	   line	  dividing	   it	   into	   two	  equal 	  hemispherical	  
regions,	  each	  of	  which	  is 	  uniformly	   the 	  same	  shade	  of	  red.	  Here 	  the 	  ball 	  has	  (at	  least)	  two	  
instances 	  of	   the	   same	  colour.	   Precisely	   how	   we	  should	   capture 	  this 	  depends 	  on	   which	  
ontological	  system	  we	  find	  most	  compelling,	  but	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  two	  ontological 	  systems	  I	  
have	  been	  discussing	  here 	  there	  is 	  no	  serious 	  difficulty	   in	  capturing	  this 	  thought	   in	  a	  way	  
that	  allows 	  us 	  to	  count	  either	  colours 	  or	  holes.	  According	  to	  Lowe’s 	  ontology,	   the	  account	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would	   be	   that	   the	   host	   is 	   characterized	   by	   two	   numerically	   distinct	   particular	   colour	  
properties,	  or	  modes,	  which	  are	  each	  instances	  of	  the	  single 	  colour	  universal	  ‘red’.	  The	  same	  
account	   can	   then	   straightforwardly	   be	   extended	   to	   holes 	  and	   angles:	   an	   object	   can	   be	  
characterized	  by	   multiple 	  properties,	   which	   are 	  the	   holes 	  and	  which	   are	   instances	  of	   a	  
universal.
In	  the	  case 	  of	  Armstrong’s 	  ontology,	  things 	  are	  slightly	  more 	  complex.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  ball,	   the 	  universal 	  ‘red’	   is 	  instantiated	  in	   two	  places 	  at	   the	  same	  time,	   because	   it	   is	  
wholly	  present	   in	  two	  places 	  at	   the 	  same 	  time.	  Nonetheless,	  on	  Armstrong’s 	  view,	   strictly	  
speaking	  there 	  is 	  just	  one 	  universal.	  However,	  it	  is 	  not	  open	  to	  Armstrong	  to	  say	   that	  there	  
is 	   one	   particular	   that	   stands 	   in	   two	   numerically	   distinct	   instantiation	   relations	   to	   the	  
universal	  ‘red’.	  To	  say	  this 	  would	  open	  the	  door	  to	  an	  infinite	  regress	  in	  accounting	  for	  the	  
instantiation	   relation.	   To	  avoid	  this 	  problem	  Armstrong	   construes 	  the	  instantiation	  of	  the	  
universal	  by	   a 	  particular	   as	   involving	   ‘no	  addition	  of	   being’.	   If	   this	  is	  so,	   then	  we	  cannot	  
consider	  ‘instantiations’,	  in	  this	  sense,	  as	  countable	  entities.	  
This 	  difficulty	   for	   the	  two-­‐category	  ontology	  can	  be	  dealt	  with	  by	   observing	  that	   in	  
the	  case	  of	  the	  ball 	  there 	  are 	  two	  numerically	  distinct	  particulars 	  that	  separately	  instantiate	  
the	  universal:	  the	  two	  halves 	  of	  the	  ball.	  These	  halves	  are	  component	  parts 	  of	  the	  ball.	  This	  
solution	  can	  be 	  applied	  to	  the	  case	  of	  holes 	  and	  angles	  in	  the	  following	  manner:	  consider	  a	  
particular	  angular	   figure 	  like	  ‘V’,	  composed	  of	  two	  lines.	   The	  angle	  is 	  the	  relation	  between	  
the	  two	  lines:	  in	  Armstrong’s 	  ontology	  we	  say	  that	  the	  pair	  of	  lines 	  instantiate	  the	  relational	  
universal:	   the	  relational 	  universal 	  is	   the 	  angle.	  Now,	   consider	   an	   angular	   figure	  like	   ‘|_|’	  
with	   two	  angles.	   Here	   the	   figure 	  is 	  composed	  of	   three 	  lines,	   but	   each	  angle	  can	   remain	  
instantiated	  even	  when	  one	  of	   the	  lines	  is 	  removed	  –	   either	   the 	  left	   upright	   or	   the 	  right	  
upright	  line.	  If	  we	  remove 	  an	  upright,	  say	  the	  right	  one,	  we	  are 	  left	  with	  a 	  component	  part	  
of	  the	  original 	  figure,	  but	  which	  has 	  just	  one 	  angle:	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  parts.	  If,	  on	  the	  
other	  hand,	  we	  were	  to	  remove	  the	  left	  upright	  from	  the	  original	  figure 	  we	  would	  also	  be	  
left	   with	  a 	  component	  part	  with	  just	   one	  angle:	   the	  relation	  between	  its 	  parts.	  However,	  
each	   of	   these	   component	   parts	   of	   the	   original 	   figure	   has 	   some	   part	   in	   common:	   the	  
horizontal 	   line.	   So,	   in	   Armstrong’s	   ontology	   we	   can	   still 	   truly	   say	   that	   there	   are	   two	  
instances 	  of	  the 	  same	  property,	  because	  there	  are	  two	  distinct	  particulars	  that	  instantiate	  
the	  same	  relation.	  However,	  on	  this	  view,	   these	  particulars 	  are	  not	   the	  angles	  themselves,	  
but	  angular	  figures.
	   However,	   there	  remain	  some 	  true 	  claims	  that	   can	  be	  made 	  about	   holes 	  that	   will 	  
need	  paraphrasing	  by	  the	  non-­‐objectualist.	  Consider	  these	  two	  sentences:
1. The	  right	  ventricle	  of	  his	  heart	  has	  enlarged.
2. We	  have	  passed	  a	  catheter	  through	  the	  hole	  in	  his	  heart.
The	   first	   sentence	   expresses	   a	   case	   of	   numerical 	   identity	   over	   time,	   with	   a 	  qualitative	  
change	  in	  one	  cavity	  of	  a	  heart.	  This	  implies 	  an	  object,	   the	  cavity,	   changing	  over	   time.	  The	  
problem	   for	   the 	  non-­‐objectualist	   is 	  that	   it	   is 	  not	   immediately	   clear	   that	   they	   have	   the	  
resources 	  to	  give	  a 	  plausible 	  account	  of	  such	  cases.	  One	  strategy	  that	  is 	  available 	  to	  the 	  non-­‐
objectualist	   to	   deal 	  with	   them	   is	   to	   observe	   that	   (1)	   will 	   be	   true	   in 	   one	  of	   these 	   two	  
situations:	  
(a)	  The 	  relations	  between	  the 	  parts	  of	  the	  heart	  wall 	  are	  changed	  (the	  heart	  walls 	  become	  
stretched)	  or	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(b)	  some 	  parts 	  of	  the	  heart	  wall 	  are	  removed	  to	  produce 	  a 	  heart	  wall 	  made 	  of	  some	  of	  the	  
remaining	  parts	  of	  the	  heart	  wall	  (the	  heart	  walls	  are	  thinned).	  
They	   could	  then	  suggest	  that	   (1)	  is 	  simply	   a	  paraphrase	  of	  either	   (a)	  or	  (b).	  Neither	  (a)	  nor	  
(b)	  would	  require	  the	  introduction	  of	  an	  object	  that	  is	  the	  cavity:	   they	  would	  both	  require	  
the	   introduction	   of	  other	   objects,	   such	  as 	  the	  parts	  of	   the	  heart	  wall.	   Consequently,	   (1)	  
doesn’t	  require	  the	  introduction	  of	  an	  object	  that	  is 	  the	  cavity.	  There	  is 	  a 	  cost	  to	  this 	  move,	  
though:	   because	   the	  change	   takes	  place	  over	   time	   the	  original 	  relation	   which	   the	   non-­‐
objectualist	   identifies	   with	   the	   ventricle 	   must	   cease	   to	   be	   instantiated	   –	   so	   the	   non-­‐
objectualist	  may	  be	  committed	  to	  no	  identity	  over	  time	  for	  holes.	  
	   Sentences	  like	  (2)	  are 	  tricky	  for	  a 	  different	  reason.	  It	  is 	  not	  possible 	  to	  pass 	  anything	  
through	  properties,	  whether	   they	   are	  conceived	  as 	  universals 	  or	   particulars.	  Nonetheless,	  
this 	  can	  be	  dealt	  with	  as 	  follows.	  When	  a 	  sentence	  like	  (2)	  is 	  true,	  something	  will 	  have	  been	  
passed	  through	  the	  region	  of	  space	  bounded	  by	  the	  parts 	  of	  the	  heart	   that	   instantiate	  the	  
relation	  that	  is 	  the 	  hole.	  So,	  claims	  about	  interaction	  with	  holes	  like	  (2)	  can	  be 	  understood	  
as	  paraphrases	  of	  sentences	  mentioning	  the	  region	  of	  space	  which	  the	  hole	  marks	  out.
Conclusion
	   In	  their	  2004	  paper	  ‘Counting	  the 	  holes’,	  Casati 	  and	  Varzi	  argue	  that	  if	  you	  have	  two	  
different	   languages	   which	   are	   equally	   good	   for	   expressing	   things	   about	   holes,	   but	   one	  
employs	  substantives 	  like 	  ‘the	  hole’	  and	  the 	  other	  makes 	  no	  such	  use,	  then	  nothing	  can	  be	  
settled	  about	  the 	  metaphysics 	  of	  holes 	  by	   appeal	  to	  the 	  expressive	  power	  of	  the	  language.	  
Each	   language 	   entitles 	   us 	   to	   hold	   different	   metaphysical 	   views	   about	   holes,	   but	   the	  
expressive	  power	  of	  the	  language	  can	  decide	  nothing	  about	  the	  correctness 	  or	  incorrectness	  
of	  any	   such	  metaphysical	  position.	  An	  argument	  of	  a 	  different	   sort	  is 	  needed	   if	  we	  are 	  to	  
decide	  on	  the	  adequacy	   of	  a 	  metaphysics	  of	  holes.	   In	  this 	  paper	   I	  have 	  tried	  to	  articulate	  
such	  an	  argument	  with	  the	  following	  structure:
1. Angles	  are	  not	  objects	  but	  are	  properties	  or	  relations.
2. Whatever	  angles	  are	  and	  are	  not,	  holes	  will	  also	  be	  and	  not	  be.
3. So,	  holes	  are	  not	  objects,	  but	  are	  properties	  or	  relations.
At	   the 	  outset	   of	   the	   Lewis’	   original	   discussion	   of	   holes,	   Argle	  declares 	   “I	   believe 	   in	  
nothing	   but	   concrete 	  material 	   objects”.	   Bargle 	   then	   raises 	   the	   existence	   of	   holes 	  as 	   a	  
difficulty	   for	  Argle’s 	  nominalism.	  The 	  Lewises	  were	  correct	  to	  address 	  this 	  challenge:	  holes	  
are	  perplexing	  entities	  precisely	   because	  they	   raise 	  problems 	  about	  where	  to	  fit	   them	  into	  
any	  ontology.	   Those,	   like	  David	  Lewis,	  whose 	  concern	  for	   ontological 	  economy	   leads 	  them	  
to	  limit	  the	  number	  of	  ontological 	  categories 	  face	  difficulties 	  in	  preserving	  the 	  truth	  of	  many	  
sentences	  about	  holes.	  Other	  philosophers,	  such	  as 	  Casati 	  and	  Varzi,	  take	  such	  difficulties 	  to	  
show	  the	  need	  for	  a 	  more 	  inflated	  ontology	   than	  Lewis’	  demand	  for	  ontological 	  economy	  
would	  permit.	  However,	  even	  philosophers	  who	  agree	  with	  Casati	  and	  Varzi 	  about	  this 	  find	  
their	   introduction	  of	  a 	  sui	  generis	  entity,	  such	  as 	  an	  immaterial 	  object,	  difficult	  to	  accept	  –	  
probably	   because 	  such	  objects	  are	  not	   acknowledged	  by	   any	   physical 	  science.6 	  However,	  
the	  suggestion	  I 	  have	  outlined	  here,	  that	  holes 	  are	  relations,	  offers 	  the	  twin	  advantages 	  of	  
dealing	  with	  the	  many	   sentences 	  about	  holes 	  that	  a	  more	  limited	  ontology	   cannot,	  and	  of	  
doing	  so	  by	  placing	  holes	  in	  a	  category	  that,	  plausibly,	   is 	  required	  by	  the	  physical 	  sciences.	  
This 	  is 	  because	  the	  categorical	  distinction	  between	  object	  and	  property	  is 	  introduced	  to	  give	  
an	  adequate	  account	  of	  states	  of	  affairs,	  which	  it	  is 	  argued	  are	  needed	  for	  truthmaking.	  This	  
is 	  not	  to	  insist	  on	  the	  correctness 	  of	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  but	  just	  to	  point	  out	  that,	  if	  correct,	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6 See, for example, Wake,	  Spencer,	  Fowler	  (2007)
would	   forestall 	   the 	   kind	   of	   reservations 	   that	   are	   entertained	   about	   Casati 	   and	   Varzi’s	  
account	  of	  holes.
At	   the 	  outset	   of	   my	   own	   discussion,	   I 	   observed	   that	   any	   attempt	   to	   say	   which	  
category	  holes 	  belong	  to	  presupposes 	  some	  prior	  commitment	  about	  what	  the	  fundamental	  
ontological	  categories 	  are.	  Instead,	  I 	  have	  laid	  out	  the	  ways 	  in	  which	  my	  claim	  that	  holes 	  are	  
relations	   can	   be	   developed	   within	   two	   different	   ontological	   systems 	   which	   both	  
acknowledge	  a	  fundamental 	  categorical 	  distinction	  between	  objects 	  and	  properties.	  In	  view	  
of	  the 	  difficulties 	  holes	  raise	  for	  Lewis’	  nominalism,	  this	  provides 	  some	  measure	  of	  support	  
for	   these	  ontologies 	  over	   Lewis’.	   However,	   as	  we	  have 	  seen,	   the	   two	  category	   ontology	  
favoured	  by	  Armstrong	  runs	  into	  some	  difficulties	  over	  counting	  instantiations 	  which	  are 	  not	  
encountered	  by	  the 	  four	  category	  ontology	  favoured	  by	  Lowe.	  This 	  provides	  some	  reason	  to	  
prefer	   the	   latter	   ontological 	   system	   over	   the	   former;	   though	   this 	   reason	   is,	   of	   course,	  
defeasible.
There	  is	  one	  final 	  point	  of	  interest	  with	  the	  position	  I	  have	  defended	  which	  is 	  worth	  
noting	  here:	   recently	  Roy	  Sorensen7	  has	  defended	  the	  view	  that	  shadows	  are	  holes 	  in	  light	  
and	  that	   the 	  perceptibility	   of	   such	  absences	  means 	  we 	  should	  construe	  them	  as	  causally	  
efficacious.	  However,	  construing	  holes 	  as 	  relations,	  as 	  I 	  have	  suggested	  here,	  may	  provide	  a	  
way	   of	   preserving	   Sorensen’s	   plausible	   account	   of	   the	   metaphysics 	  of	   holes 	  without	   a	  
commitment	  to	  the 	  idea	  that	  their	  perceptibility	  requires	  acknowledging	  causally	  efficacious	  
absences.
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